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The  purpose  of  the  present  article  is  to  investigate,  within  the  cognitive 
grammar  framework,  morphological  motivation  of  adjectives  functioning  as 
nouns and factors that determine their change of grammatical category.  
Cognitive  grammar  (Langacker  1987,  1991a)  makes  a  broad  distinction 
between only two kinds of linguistic expressions called predications – those that 
designate things and those that designate relations. Although the classification is 
so  minimal,  compared  with  the  traditional  approach  where  more  classes  are 
distinguished, there is still a possibility for members of one class to move to the 
other. The article is concerned with formal mechanisms of the process as well as 
finding answers to the following questions: Under what circumstances and what 
kind  of  atemporal  relations  (i.e.,  adjectives)  can  become  things  (i.e.,  nouns) 
without  undergoing  any  affixation  process?  What  are  the  basic  types  of  de-
adjectival conversion nominalisations? What is the meaning of so derived lexical 
items? As semantics seems to play a major part in the process of nominalisation, 
an attempt at finding some satisfactory solutions to these problems cannot be made 
without reference to the linguistic theory in which it received due recognition, or 
without coming back to the basic truths that are most easily overlooked. 
Basic terms 
I will start by briefly reviewing some basic theoretical concepts as set forth 
in  Langacker  (1987,  1991a).  Cognitive  grammar  assumes  that  lexicon, 
morphology  and  syntax  form  a  continuum  of  symbolic  units,  divided  only 
arbitrarily  into  separate  components.  Langacker  (1991b:1)  argues  that  it  is 
ultimately as pointless to analyze grammatical units without reference to their 
semantic value as to write a dictionary which omits the meanings of its lexical  
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items. Meaning is not defined by formal, logic rules based on truth conditions, 
but on the contrary – a conceptual view of meaning, in which semantic structure 
is equated with conceptual structure, has been adopted. Semantic structures are 
referred to as linguistic predications. 
The theory posits that the meaning of a predication involves more than just 
its  objective  content  –  i.e.  speakers  have  the  inherent  ability  to  construe 
conceived situations in different ways for purposes of linguistic coding. This 
ability,  which  is  regarded  as  fundamental  to  understanding  grammatical 
organisation,  is  known  as  imagery.  Various  dimensions  of  imagery  are 
recognised, the most important of which is the profile/base distinction. Linguistic 
predications are defined via the imposition of a figure/ground organisation on 
one or more cognitive domains (or bases) of varying degrees of complexity. The 
base for a linguistic predication is its domain. An aspect singled out of the base 
that a predication designates is called the profile, and the relation between the 
profile  and  base  determines  the  semantic  value  of  a  linguistic  expression. 
Different  expressions  can  invoke  the  same  domain,  but  nevertheless  contrast 
semantically by choosing alternate profiles within the common base. Schemas 
are  generalisations  extracted  from  specific  structures.  They  categorise  such 
structures through relations of elaboration or extension, and are used for creating 
novel  expressions  and  usage.  Within  the  profile,  one  entity  is  usually  given 
special  prominence  with  respect  to  other  profiled  entities.  This  entity,  the 
trajector, can be regarded as the figure in a relational profile, and prominent 
parts of the profile other than the trajector are called landmarks. 
Basic categorisation problems 
First of all, let us think about what makes a word a noun or an adjective and 
how the same word can, in one context, be recognised as an adjective, while in 
another, it changes its syntactic category not experiencing any alterations to its 
form and becomes a noun. Cognitive linguistics rejected the classical view of 
categorisation  which  claims  that  categories  are  clearly  defined  by  means  of 
binary  features,  have  precise  boundaries,  and  all  their  members  have  equal 
status. It presupposes that any entity that exhibits all the defining features of a 
category is a representative of that category. By contrast, cognitive linguists have 
adopted a prototype view of grammatical categories, according to which, some 
members of a category are better examples of it while others can have a marginal 
status;  as  a  consequence,  boundaries  of  categories  have  become  fuzzy  and 
blurred. Just as there are central and peripheral representatives of the conceptual 
category FURNITURE,
1 the same holds true for a linguistic category like NOUN 
 
 
1 For detailed discussion of prototype categories see Taylor (1989).  
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whose membership is graded. Although the centre of the category NOUN lies far 
away  from  the  centre  of  the  category  ADJECTIVE  (one  prototypically 
designating a discrete, concrete, three dimensional entity, the other indicating a 
quality of a person or thing referred to by a NOUN), there is a certain degree of 
overlapping between the two seemingly independent categories. Colour terms 
and  nationalities  (discussed  further  in  the  article),  both  likely  to  function  as 
NOUNS and ADJECTIVES, can serve as examples.  
Langacker (1987:189) describes NOUNS as linguistic units which profile 
things, where thing is defined as a region in some domain. Persons and objects 
are  bounded  regions  in  the  domain  of  three-dimensional  space,  while  mass 
concrete  nouns  profile  unbounded  regions.  Because  physical  objects  occupy 
bounded regions in three-dimensional space, expressions which designate such 
objects  qualify  as  count  nouns.  Contrasted  with  NOUNS,  there  are 
ADJECTIVES, defined as linguistic units which profile atemporal relations. It is 
possible for a relation to become a thing by a projection of the thing-schema on 
to non-spatial domains; as a consequence, linguistic units which profile regions 
in  other  domains,  such  as  colour  or  nationality,  get  included  in  the  NOUN 
category. The process can be called category extension and is semantic in nature 
due to the fact that it is the resemblance of meaning between two members of 
distinct  categories  which  permits  different  significations  to  get  associated, 
resulting in the shift of category. 
The basics of conversion 
According  to  Centarowska  (1993:14),  the  term  conversion  was  most 
probably first introduced by Sweet in his New English Grammar published in 
Oxford in 1892. It denoted the taking on by word of a function which is not its 
basic  one.  Sweet  used  the  notion  of  conversion  with  reference  to  syntactic 
transposition of words like the nominal use of the adjective poor in the phrase 
the  poor.  Quirk  (1972:1009)  describes  conversion  as  derivational  process  in 
which no addition of an affix takes place while an item is adapted or converted 
to a new word-class. It is interesting to note that in Quirk’s study the process of 
conversion is treated as gradual, in which a distinction is made between full and 
partial conversion. Quirk claims that in expressions such as the poor, the wealthy, 
the ignorant, the wicked, etc., the adjective is only partially converted into a 
noun as it functions as the head of the noun phrase, but syntactically it behaves 
like a noun rather than an adjective.  
Bauer (1983:226)  pays  attention  to  the importance of  conversion for the 
English language:  
Conversion is an extremely productive way of producing new words in English. There do not 
appear  to  be  morphological  restrictions  on  the  forms  that  can  undergo  conversion,  so  that  
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compounds,  derivatives,  acronyms,  blends,  clipped  forms  are  all  acceptable  inputs  to  the 
conversion process. 
Štekauer (1998:11), on the other hand, observes that the most striking feature 
of  conversion  is  that  it  always  linguistically  expresses  the  conceptual 
recategorization  of  the  extra-linguistic  reality.  According  to  him  the  basic 
features of conversion in English are as follows: 
a) conceptual recategorisation, 
b) unanalysable onomasiological level, 
c) change of word-class, 
d) close semantic affinity between conversion pair members, 
e) phonematic/orthographic identity of fundamental forms, 
f) change of paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations at the system level (langue). 
Since the phenomenon of conversion presupposes so many aspects, different 
terminology has been applied by linguists to underline its multifarious nature. 
Other terms used interchangeably, although having different connotations, are: 
zero-derivation,  zero-affixation,  bare  nominalisation  and  paradigmatic 
derivation. 
Basic mechanisms of de-adjectival nominalisation 
As it has already been observed in the present article, cognitive grammar 
explains  nominalisation  in  terms  of  semantic  extension.  To  understand  the 
mechanism of the process, we will first have to look more closely at the notions 
of  NOUN  characterised  as  a  thing  and  ADJECTIVE  perceived  as  a  simple 
atemporal relation. We can assume after Langacker (1991b:74) that: 
[…] most broadly the meanings of linguistic expressions divide themselves into ‘nominal’ vs. 
‘relational’ predications. These two types do not necessarily differ in the nature of their intrinsic 
content,  but  rather  in  how  this  content  is  construed  and  profiled.  A  nominal  predication 
presupposes the interconnections among a set of conceived entities, and profiles the region thus 
established. On the other hand, a relational predication presupposes a set of entities, and profiles 
the interconnections among these entities. 
Thus, a noun profiles a thing, i.e. a region in some domain, where a region is 
characterised as a set of interconnected entities, whereas an adjective constituting 
the category of relational predication puts interconnections in profile (rather than 
simply presupposing them as part of the base). Semantic extension operates by 
means  of  profile  shift.  In  de-adjectival  nominalisation,  some  facet  of  the 
relational predication is reified (i.e., construed as a thing) and put in profile, 
while the relational profile of the adjective gets demoted to the unprofiled base 
of  predication.  Interconnections  function  as  the  most  important  elements  of 
adjectives.  They  and  the  participating  entities  are  highlighted  in  the  case  of 
relations, while in the conceptualisation of things both types of elements, i.e.  
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relations  and  entities,  remain  part  of  the  unprofiled  base.  In  the  case  of  de-
adjectival nominalisation a shift in the atemporal relation’s profile takes place. It 
means  that  the  relations  between  the  trajector  and landmark,  constituting  the 
essence of its category, are not in focus of attention, but rather it is shifted to the 
whole region. The process can be illustrated by the following examples:  
(1) 
(a) I don’t mind that purple curtain. 
(b) Purple doesn’t go well with that curtain. 
In (1a) purple shows characteristics of an adjective because it profiles a 
relationship  between  the  trajector  elaborated  by  the  thing  curtain  and  the 
landmark which serves as the elaboration site for purple. In (1b), on the other 
hand, purple constitutes a higher level of conceptual organisation as it designates 
a  bounded  region  in  colour  space.  The  above  examples  seem  to  prove  that 
atemporal relations can be transformed into things not by changing conceptual 
content, but rather by their profiling of interconnections. 
Basic typology 
When we talk about adjectives in English that can or cannot undergo the 
process of conversion nominalisation, for the needs of this particular article, we 
can distinguish two basic classes. The first one includes adjectives that function 
as  heads  of  noun  phrases  and  which  Bertrand  (1995:49)  calls  invariable 
adjectival nouns, the other one, following the same author, can be referred to as 
variable adjectival nouns. 
Class 1 
The poor have been causing great concern. 
The rich live in large houses. 
The corrupt will not be liable for prosecution. 
Class 2 
Americans have become the strongest nation in the world. 
There are no blondes in my group. 
He is a major in the U.S. army. 
Nominalisations  belonging  to  Class  1  do  not  inflect  for  number  or  for 
genitive case, they take a definite determiner, have generic reference and take 
plural concord, whereas those in Class 2 can have both plural and singular forms, 
can be inflected for the genitive and take indefinite determiners. Analysing the 
above examples in a broader perspective, it seems justified to treat the process of 
de-adjectival nominalisation as a continuum, in which on one end of the scale 
there  is  a  prototypical  adjective,  and  on  the  other  end  a  prototypical  noun.  
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Perceived in this way, Class 1 constitutes an intermediate stage of conversion 
from an adjective into a noun, having characteristics of both, while in Class 2 the 
features typical of a noun are more salient. In fact, within the very boundaries 
(themselves opaque and fuzzy) of the two classes a prototypical structure can be 
observed. When we speak of the rich or the aged, we refer, as Quirk (1985:138) 
describes it, to certain well-established classes of persons. So it seems that the 
most prototypical Class 1 members designate entire groups of people sharing the 
same: 
– nationality (the French, the Dutch, the Welsh, etc.), 
– age (the old, the young, the elderly, the aged, etc.), 
– social status (the unemployed, the poor, the homeless, the famous, the rich, the 
underprivileged, etc.), 
– physical state (the blind, the deaf, the dumb, the handicapped, the disabled, 
the sick, the wounded, the living, the dead, etc.), 
– features of character (the brave, the meek, the faint-hearted, etc.). 
All  of  these  refer  to  people  having  in  common  some  distinguishing 
characteristics which single them out from the rest. It is also possible to create, 
along  these  lines,  further  conversions  taking  as  a  reference  other  features, 
although they will definitely be less prototypical and the noun status of many of 
them can be questioned, e.g.: 
– height (the tall, the short, the middle-height, etc.), 
– physical aspect (the slim, the fat, the pretty, the ugly, etc.), 
– emotional state (the happy, the funny, the scared, etc.), 
– intellectual capacities (the silly, the sensible, the clever, etc.). 
The reason why many of them are less acceptable is that people with these 
characteristics  do  not  form  natural  and  compact  classes,  which  means  that 
somebody being fat or pretty is, in most situations, not enough to be perceived 
as  belonging  to  some  special  group.  So  it  seems  that  the  features  are  too 
common as well as transitory (allowing for the possibility of being changed – 
e.g. somebody happy can become sad, or somebody fat can lose weight) to 
sufficiently  separate  their  members  from  the  rest.  This  way  of  generating 
peripheral extensions from the centre of the prototype can be very productive. 
Cognitive grammar accommodates the projection of grammatical rules to novel 
expressions through the same basic devices required to handle the specialised 
use and figurative extension of lexical items. An interesting example, taken 
from  a  Business  Week  magazine  advertisement,  is  quoted  by  Bertrand 
(1995:58): 
(2) The new Lexus. What the driven will want to drive. 
The advertisement refers to the normally chauffeur-driven executives who, 
with the Lexus, will want to actually take over the driving. The advertising trick 
is to make ordinary people want to feel they can identify with top executives if  
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they buy this make of car. In this example the driven is a group of people blessed 
with exceptional wealth who are very different from the common mortal. In the 
same way, the rich is a way for ordinary people to describe a very exceptional 
and  inaccessible  class,  with  the  added  undercurrent  of  envy  and  resentment 
towards a group felt to be very different to oneself. Bertrand (1995:59) concludes 
that it is the IAN
2 form that facilitates and stresses this distancing from the group 
described. 
Semantic extension can also operate in a different direction leading to the 
creation of Class 1 de-adjectival conversion nominalisations referring not to 
groups of people, but rather to groups of abstract ideas or phenomena, e.g.: 
(3) 
(a) He has always been fascinated by the supernatural. 
(b) She thought about it as something very ordinary,  very down-to-earth, far 
from the philosophical. 
(c) Have you heard the latest? John is getting married. 
Although here the first parameter of Quirk’s (1985:138) definition – classes 
of persons – has changed, the second one, which is the necessity of sharing 
common well-established features, has stayed the same. Other examples of Class 
1 border cases include the following: 
(4) The young students found the course difficult, the older found it easy. 
Here, the older does not have generic reference and is elliptical for the older 
students, situating it closer than other Class 1 representatives to the adjective end 
on the conversion scale. 
There  are  Class  1  members  that  unlike  nouns  can  be  premodified  by 
adverbs (the extremely old, the very wise) and others that like nouns can be 
premodified by adjectives (the humble poor). Quirk (1985:251) observes that 
premodification  by  adverbs  seems  to  be  easier  than  premodification  by 
adjectives. On the other hand, postmodification by relative clauses (the old who 
resist  change)  and  postmodification  by  prepositional  phrases  (the  young  in 
spirit) is characteristic of nouns. Another reason for Class 1 members to be 
placed closer to the adjective end of the scale than the representatives of Class 
2  is  the  fact  that,  in  contrast  with  the  latter,  they  can  be  inflected  for 
comparison (the younger). Still, the class is by no means monolithic as many of 
its members do not share these qualities (*the more unemployed). 
Although central representatives of the category require the generic the, 
peripheral instances can function without it: 
 
 
2 IAN stands for ‘invariable adjectival nouns’ and roughly corresponds to Class 1 adjectival 
nominalisations.  
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(5) 
(a) He is acceptable to both old and young. 
(b) Britain’s 3 million unemployed may soon start to protest. 
(c) There were 28 dead in the accident. 
(d) The issue is of interest to most French. 
There are also examples where Class 1 members, similarly to Class 2, can 
take singular concord, e.g.: 
(6) The accused was led into the dock. 
Class 2 nominalisations refer to : 
– nationality (Americans, Italians), 
– regional origin (Texans, Europeans, Spartans), 
– religion (Catholics, Moslems, Puritans, Protestants), 
– political party (Conservatives, Republicans, Radicals), 
– health problems (anorexics, alcoholics, hypochondriacs). 
Treating the above examples as more or less central, or prototypical, we can 
find further extensions of the subcategories. Langacker (1991b:194) observes that: 
[…]  coherent  mental  experience  is  structured  with  reference  to  previous  experience.  The 
activation  of  a  previously  established  cognitive  routine  serves  as  standard  (S)  for  an  act  of 
comparison in which some facet of current experience functions as target (T): to the extent that 
S>T approximates zero, the overall event is one of recognition, and T is thereby interpreted as an 
instance of S. 
In the quoted examples more central class representatives serve as models 
for the initiation of novel nominalisations, for instance, the criterion of regional 
origin  can be  broadened to  include ethnic origin  (whites,  blacks), language 
community (Hispanics), or even real life/fiction characters (goodies, baddies). 
Other  representatives  might  constitute  miscellaneous  groups  of  people  like 
vegetarians,  militants,  intellectuals,  blondes,  brunettes,  homosexuals,  gays, 
relatives, mortals, humans. These instantiations elaborate the schema in different 
ways along various parameters. Just like in the case of Class 1, new extensions 
can be created changing the profiled domain from humans into non-animates: 
chemicals, basics, colds. Finally, some nominalisations can refer both to humans 
and non-animates, e.g.:  
major – (a) ‘an army officer’, (b) ‘the main course’, 
principal – (a) ‘a person with the highest authority’, (b) ‘an amount of money 
lent’, 
black – (a) ‘an ethnic group member’, (b) ‘a colour’. 
Semantic  extension  lies  at  the  core  of  all  possible  instances  studied  as 
conversion  de-adjectival  nominalisation.  In  fact,  a  prototypical  adjective  can 
serve as a point of departure for extensions which can be schematic for others. 
Perceived in this way, the linguistic phenomenon of de-adjectival conversion  
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nominalisation  can  be  described  as  a  gradual  bounding  of  interconnections 
within the atemporal relation. Different phases of the process can be identified, 
Class  1  and  Class  2  being  important  landmarks  along  the  way,  situated 
respectively closer and further form the point of departure and further and closer 
to  their  destination  which  is  a  bounded  region,  or  a  prototypical  noun. 
Nominalisation can be illustrated as a continuum by the following examples:
3 
 
Adjective  Class 1  Class 2  Noun 
German nation  the German  Germans  German (language) 
white people  the white  Whites  white (colour) 
basic things  the basics  Basics  Basic (program) 
good people/things  the good  Good  good (goodness) 
 
Although Class 1 and Class 2 representatives can both refer to the domains of 
nationality and ethnic origin, they are perceived in a different way in both cases. 
The  German  and  the  white  have  a  generic  reference  and  comprise  the  whole 
national  or  ethnic  class  of  people,  whereas  Germans  and  whites  designate 
individual representatives of the nation or ethnic group. The difference is very 
similar to that between mass nouns and count nouns as it has been discussed by 
Langacker (1991a:79). Analysing the expressions gravel and pebbles, he notes that 
although both nouns can refer to the same entity, the speaker perceives gravel as a 
heap of undifferentiated instances of small stones, while pebbles (which can be the 
same objects) are seen as a replicate mass of numerous instances of small stones.  
In the foregoing analysis we have made an attempt at applying the cognitive 
grammar  apparatus  to  the  linguistic  phenomenon  of  de-adjectival  conversion 
nominalisation  in  English.  Although  only  very  basic  examples  have  been 
discussed, the reader could get an idea of the scope of the problems involved. 
Our  goal  was  to  present  conversion  nominalisation  as  a  symbolic  resource 
providing the speakers with a productive word formation tool.  
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